Abstract. To make a joint decision, agents (or voters) are often required to provide their preferences as linear orders. To determine a winner, the given linear orders can be aggregated according to a voting protocol. However, in realistic settings, the voters may often only provide partial orders. This directly leads to the POSSIBLE WINNER problem that asks, given a set of partial votes, if a distinguished candidate can still become a winner. In this work, we consider the computational complexity of POSSIBLE WINNER for the broad class of voting protocols defined by scoring rules. A scoring rule provides a score value for every position which a candidate can have in a linear order. Prominent examples include plurality, k-approval, and Borda. Generalizing previous NP-hardness results for some special cases and providing new many-one reductions, we settle the computational complexity for all but one scoring rule. More precisely, for an unbounded number of candidates and unweighted voters, we show that POSSI-BLE WINNER is NP-complete for all pure scoring rules except plurality, veto, and the scoring rule defined by the scoring vector (2, 1, . . . , 1, 0), while it is solvable in polynomial time for plurality and veto.
Introduction
Voting scenarios arise whenever the preferences of different parties (voters) have to be aggregated to form a joint decision. This is what happens in political elections, group decisions, web site rankings, or multiagent systems. Often, the voting process is executed in the following way: each voter provides his preference as a ranking (linear order) of all the possible alternatives (candidates). Given these rankings as an input, a voting rule produces a subset of the candidates (winners) as an output. However, in realistic settings, the voters may often only provide partial orders instead of linear ones: For example, it might be impossible for the voters to provide a complete preference list because the set of candidates is too large. In addition, not all voters might have given their preferences yet during the aggregation process, or new candidates might be introduced after some voters already have given their rankings. Moreover, one often has to deal with partial votes due to incomparabilities: for some voters it might not be possible to compare two candidates or certain groups of candidates, be it because of lack of information or due to personal reasons. Hence, the study of partial voting profiles is natural and essential. One question that immediately comes to mind is whether any information on a possible outcome of the voting process can be given in the case of incomplete votes. More specifically, in this paper, we study the POSSIBLE WINNER problem: Given a partial order for each of the voters, can a distinguished candidate c win for at least one extension of the partial orders into linear ones?
Of course, the answer to this question depends on the voting rule that is used. In this work, we will stick to the broad class of voting protocols defined by scoring rules. A scoring rule provides a score value for every position that a candidate can take within a linear order. The scores of the candidates are then added up and the candidates with the highest score win. Many well-known voting protocols, including plurality, veto, and Borda, are realized by scoring rules. Other examples are the Formula 1 scoring, which uses the scoring rule defined by the vector (10, 8, 6 , 5, 4, 3, 2, 1, 0, ...), or k-approval, which is used in many political elections whenever the voters can express their preference for k candidates within the set of all candidates.
The POSSIBLE WINNER problem was introduced by Konczak and Lang [6] and has been further investigated since then for many types of voting systems [1, [7] [8] [9] [10] . Note that the related NECESSARY WINNER problem can be solved in polynomial time for all scoring rules [10] . A prominent special case of POSSIBLE WINNER is MANIP-ULATION (see e.g. [2, 5, 11, 12] ). Here, the given set of partial orders consists of two subsets; one subset contains linearly ordered votes and the other one completely unordered votes. Clearly, all NP-hardness results would carry over from MANIPULATION to POSSIBLE WINNER. However, whereas the case of weighted voters is settled by a full dichotomy [5] for MANIPULATION for scoring rules, we are not aware of any NP-hardness results for scoring rules in the unweighted voter case.
Let us briefly summarize known results for POSSIBLE WINNER for scoring rules. Correcting Konczak and Lang [6] who claimed polynomial-time solvability for all scoring rules, Xia and Conitzer [10] provided NP-completeness results for a class of scoring rules, more specifically, for all scoring rules that have four "equally decreasing score values" followed by another "strictly decreasing score value"; we will provide a more detailed discussion later. Betzler et al. [1] studied the parameterized complexity of POS-SIBLE WINNER and, among other results obtained NP-hardness for k-approval in case of two partial orders. However, this NP-hardness result holds only if k is part of the input, and it does not carry over for fixed values of k. Further, due to the restriction to two partial votes, the construction is completely different from the constructions used in this work.
Until now, the computational complexity of POSSIBLE WINNER was still open for a large number of naturally appearing scoring rules. We mention k-approval for small values of k as an example: Assume that one may vote for a board that consists of five members by awarding one point each to five of the candidates (5-approval). Surprisingly, POSSIBLE WINNER turns out to be NP-hard even for 2-approval. Another example is given by voting systems in which each voter is allowed to specify a (small) group of favorites and a (small) group of most disliked candidates.
In this work, we settle the computational complexity of POSSIBLE WINNER for all pure scoring rules except the scoring rule defined by (2, 1, . . . , 1, 0).
1 For plurality and veto, we provide polynomial-time algorithms. The basic idea to show the NPcompleteness for all remaining pure scoring rules can be described as follows. Every scoring vector of unbounded length must either have an unbounded number of positions with different score values or must have an unbounded number of positions with equal score values (or both). Hence, we give many-one reductions covering these two types and then combine them to work for all considered scoring rules. Scoring rules having an unbounded number of positions with different score values are treated in Section 2, where we generalize results from [10] . Scoring rules having an unbounded number of positions with equal score values are investigated in Section 3. Here, we consider two subcases. In one subcase, we consider scoring rules of the form (α 1 , α 2 , . . . , α 2 , 0), which we deal with in Section 3.2. In the other subcase, we consider all remaining scoring rules with an unbounded number of candidates (Section 3.1). Finally, we combine the obtained results in the main theorem (Section 4).
Preliminaries. Let C = {c 1 , . . . , c m } be the set of candidates. A vote is a linear order (i.e., a transitive, antisymmetric, and total relation) on C. An n-voter profile P on C consists of n votes (v 1 , . . . , v n ) on C. A voting rule r is a function from the set of all profiles on C to the power set of C. (Positional) scoring rules are defined by scoring vectors − → α = (α 1 , α 2 , . . . , α m ) with integers α 1 ≥ α 2 ≥ · · · ≥ α m , the score values. More specifically, we define that a scoring rule r consists of a sequence of scoring vectors s 1 , s 2 , . . . such that for any i ∈ AE there is a scoring vector for i candidates which can be computed in time polynomial in i. 2 Here, we restrict our results to pure scoring rules, that is for every i, the scoring vector for i candidates can be obtained from the scoring vector for i − 1 candidates by inserting an additional score value at an arbitrary position (respecting the described monotonicity). This definition includes all of the common protocols like Borda or k-approval. 3 We further assume that α m = 0 and that there is no integer that divides all score values. This does not constitute a restriction since for every other voting system there must be an equivalent one that fulfills these constraints [5, Observation 2.2]. Moreover, we only consider non-trivial scoring rules, that is, scoring rules with α 1 = 0 for a scoring vector of unbounded length.
For a vote v ∈ P and a candidate c ∈ C, let the score s(v, c) := α j where j is the position of c in v. For any profile P = {v 1 , . . . , v n }, let s(P, c) :
Whenever it is clear from the context which P we refer to, we will just write s(c).
The scoring rule will select all candidates c as winners for which s(P, c) is maximized. Famous examples of scoring rules are Borda, that is, (m − 1, m − 2, . . . , 0), and kapproval, that is, (1, . . . , 1, 0, . . . , 0) starting with k ones. Two relevant special cases of k-approval are plurality, that is (1, 0, . . . , 0), and veto, that is, (1, . . . , 1, 0).
A partial order on C is a reflexive, transitive, and antisymmetric relation on C. We use > to denote the relation given between candidates in a linear order and ≻ to denote the relation given between candidates in a partial order. Sometimes, we specify a whole subset of candidates in a partial order, e.g., e ≻ D. This notation means that e ≻ d for all d ∈ D and there is no specified order among the candidates in D. In contrast, writing e > D in a linear order means that the candidates of D have an arbitrary but fixed order. A linear order v l extends a partial order This definition allows that multiple candidates obtain the maximal score and we end up with a whole set of winners. If the possible winner c has to be unique, one speaks of a possible unique winner, and the corresponding decision problem is defined analogously. As discussed in the following paragraph, all our results hold for both cases.
In all many-one reductions given in this work, one constructs a partial profile P consisting of a set of linear orders V l and another set of partial votes V p . Typically, the positions of the distinguished candidate c are already determined in all votes from V p , that is, s(P, c) is fixed. The "interesting" part of the reductions is formed by the partial orders of V p in combination with upper bounds for the scores of the non-distinguished candidates. For every candidate c ′ ∈ C\{c}, the maximum partial score s
is the maximum number of points c ′ can make in V p without beating c in P . The maximum partial scores can be adapted for the unique and for the winner case since beating c in the winner case just means that a candidate makes strictly more points than c and beating c in the unique winner case means that a candidate makes as least as many points as c. Since all reductions only rely on the maximum partial scores, all results hold for both cases. For all reductions given in this work, one can generate an appropriate set of linear votes that implement the required maximum partial scores for each candidate. A general construction scheme of these votes can be found in a long version of this work. For this paper, we will refer to this construction scheme as Construction 1.
Several of our NP-hardness proofs rely on reductions from the NP-complete EXACT 3-COVER (X3C) problem. Given a set of elements E = {e 1 , . . . , e q }, a family of subsets S = {S 1 , . . . , S t } with |S i | = 3 and S i ⊆ E for 1 ≤ i ≤ t, it asks whether there is a subset S ′ ⊆ S such that for every element e j ∈ E there is exactly one S i ∈ S ′ with e j ∈ S i .
Due to the lack of space, several proofs and details had to be deferred to a full version of this paper.
Xia and Conitzer [10] showed that POSSIBLE WINNER is NP-complete for any scoring rule which contains four consecutive, equally decreasing score values, followed by another strictly decreasing score value. They gave reductions from X3C. Using some non-straightforward gadgetry, we extend their proof to work for scoring rules with an unbounded number of different, not necessarily equally decreasing score values.
We start by describing the basic idea given in [10] (using a slightly modified construction). Given an X3C-instance (E, S), construct a partial profile P := V l ∪ V p on a set of candidates C where V l denotes a set of linear orders and V p a set of t partial orders. To describe the basic idea, we assume that there is an integer b ≥ 1 such that α b > α b+1 and the difference between the score of the four following score values is equally decreasing, that is, α b − α b+1 = α b+1 − α b+2 = · · · = α b+3 − α b+4 , for a scoring vector of appropriate size. Then, C := {c, x, w} ∪ E ′ ∪ B where E ′ := {e | e ∈ E} and B contains b − 1 dummy candidates. The distinguished candidate is c. The candidates whose element counterparts belong to the set S i are denoted by e i1 , e i2 , e i3 . For every i ∈ {1, . . . , t}, the partial vote v
, the positions of all candidates except w, x, e i1 , e i2 , e i3 are fixed. More precisely, w has to be inserted between positions b and b+4 maintaining the partial order x ≻ e i1 ≻ e i2 ≻ e i3 . The maximum partial scores are set such that the following three conditions are fulfilled. First, regarding an element candidate e ∈ E ′ , inserting w behind e in two partial orders has the effect that e would beat c, whereas when w is inserted behind e in at most one partial order, c still beats e (Condition 1).
Note that e may occur in several votes at different positions, e.g. e might be identical with e i1 and e j3 for i = j. However, due to the condition of "equally decreasing" scores, "shifting" e increases its score by the same value in all of the votes. Second, the partial score of x is set such that w can be inserted behind x at most q/3 times (Condition 2). Finally, we set s max p (w) = (t − q/3) · α b +q/3 · α b+4 . This implies that if w is inserted before x in t − q/3 votes, then it must be inserted at the last possible position, that is, position b + 4, in all remaining votes (Condition 3). Now, having an exact 3-cover for (E, S), it is easy to verify that setting w to position b + 4 in the partial votes that correspond to the exact 3-cover and to position b in all remaining votes leads to an extension in which c wins. In a yes-instance for (C, P, c), it follows directly from Condition 1 and 2 that w must have the last possible position b + 4 in exactly q/3 votes and position b in all remaining partial votes. Since |E| = q and there are q/3 partial votes such that three element candidates are shifted in each of them, due to Condition 1, every element candidate must appear in exactly one of these votes. Hence, c is a possible winner in P if and only if there exists an exact 3-cover of E.
In the remainder of this section, we show how to extend the reduction to scoring rules with strictly, but not equally decreasing scoring values. The problem we encounter is the following: By sending candidate w to the last possible position in the partial vote v p i , each of the candidates e i1 , e i2 , e i3 improves by one position and therefore improves its score by the difference given between the corresponding positions. In [10] , these differences all had the same value, but now, we have to deal with varying differences. Since the same candidate e ∈ E ′ may appear in several votes at different positions, e.g. e might be identical with e i1 and e j3 for i = j, it is not clear how to set the maximum partial score of e. In order to cope with this situation, we add two copies v 
of D, the maximum partial score is set such that it can be shifted to a better position at most q times in a yes-instance. The candidate set E ′ is not relevant for the description of the gadget and thus we can assume that each candidate of E ′ can never beat c. We denote this construction as Gadget 1. Using some pigeonhole principle argument, one can show that Gadget 1 works correctly (proof omitted). Combining the construction of [10] with Gadget 1 and by using some further simple padding, one arrives at the following theorem.
Theorem 1. POSSIBLE WINNER is NP-complete for a scoring rule if, for every positive integer x, there is a number m that is a polynomial function of x and, for the scoring vector of size m, it holds that
|{i | 1 ≤ i ≤ m − 1 and α i > α i+1 }| ≥ x.
An unbounded number of positions with equal score values
In the previous section, we showed NP-hardness for scoring rules with an unbounded number of different score values. In this section, we discuss scoring rules with an unbounded number of positions with equal score value. In the first subsection, we show NP-hardness for POSSIBLE WINNER for scoring rules with an unbounded number of "non-border" positions with the same score. That is, either before or after the group of equal positions, there must be at least two positions with a different score value. In the second subsection, we consider the special type that α 1 > α 2 = · · · = α m−1 > 0.
An unbounded number of non-border positions with equal score values
Here, we discuss scoring rules with non-border equal positions. For example, a scoring rules, such that, for every positive integer x, there is a scoring vector of size m such that there is an i, with i < m − 2, and α i−x = α i . This property can be used to construct a basic "logical" tool used in the many-one reductions of this subsection: For two candidates c, c ′ , having c ≻ c ′ in a vote implies that setting c such that it makes less than α i points implies that also c ′ makes less than α i points whereas all candidates placed in the range between i − x and i make exactly α i points. This can be used to model some implication of the type "c ⇒ c ′ " in a vote. For example, for (m − 2)-approval this condition means that c only has the possibility to make zero points in a vote if also c ′ makes zero points in this vote whereas other all candidates make one point. Most of the reductions of this subsection are from the NP-complete MULTICOLORED CLIQUE (MC) problem [4] :
Given: An undirected graph G = (X 1 ∪ X 2 ∪ · · · ∪ X k , E) with X i ∩ X j = ∅ for 1 ≤ i < j ≤ k and the vertices of X i induce an independent set for 1 ≤ i ≤ k. Question: Is there a clique of size k? Here, 1, . . . , k are considered as different colors. Then, the problem is equivalent to ask for a multicolored clique, that is, a clique that contains one vertex for every color. To ease the presentation, for any 1 ≤ i = j ≤ k, we interpret the vertices of X i as red vertices and write r ∈ X i , and the vertices of X j as green vertices and write g ∈ X j .
Reductions from MC are often used to show parameterized hardness results [4] . The general idea is to construct different types of gadgets. Here, the partial votes realize four kinds of gadgets. First, gadgets that choose a vertex of every color (vertex selection). Second, gadgets that choose an edge of every ordered pair of colors, for example, one edge from green to red and one edge from red to green (edge selection). Third, gadgets that check the consistency of two selected ordered edges, e.g. does the chosen red-green candidate refer to the same edge as the choice of the green-red candidate (edge-edge match)? At last, gadgets that check if all edges starting from the same color start from the same vertex (vertex-edge match).
We start by giving a reduction from MC that settles the NP-hardness of POSSIBLE WINNER for (m − 2)-approval.
Lemma 1. POSSIBLE WINNER is NP-hard for (m − 2)-approval.
Proof. Given an MC-instance G = (X, E) with X = X 1 ∪ X 2 ∪ · · · ∪ X k . Let E(i, j) denote all edges from E between X i and X j . W.l.o.g. we can assume that there are integers s and t such that |X i | = s for 1 ≤ i ≤ k, |E(i, j)| = t for all i, j, and that k is odd. We construct a partial profile P on a set C of candidates such that a distinguished candidate c ∈ C is a possible winner if and only if there is a size-k clique in G. The set of candidates C := {c} ⊎ C X ⊎ C E ⊎ D, where ⊎ denotes the disjunctive union, is specified as follows:
e., for every edge {r, g} ∈ E(i, j), the set C E contains the four candidates rg, rg ′ , gr, gr We refer to the candidates of C X as vertex-candidates, to the candidates of C E as edgecandidates, and to the vertices of D as dummy-candidates.
The partial profile P consists of a set of linear votes V l and a set of partial votes V p . In each extension of P , the distinguished candidate c gets one point in every partial vote (see definition below). Thus, by using Construction 1, we can set the maximum partial scores as follows. For every candidate
i must get zero points (take a zero position) in at least s − 1 of the partial votes. For every remaining candidate c
′ must get zero points in at least one of the partial votes.
In the following, we define
. For all our gadgets only the last positions of the votes are relevant. Hence, in the partial votes it is sufficient to explicitly specify the "relevant candidates". More precisely, we define for all partial votes that each candidate that does not appear explicitly in the description of a partial vote is positioned before all candidates that appear in this vote.
The partial votes of V 1 realize the edge selection gadgets. Selecting an ordered edge (r, g) with {r, g} ∈ E means to select the corresponding pair of edge-candidates rg and rg ′ . The candidate rg is used for the vertex-edge match check and rg ′ for the edgeedge match check. For every ordered color pair (i, j), i = j, V 1 has t − 1 copies of the partial vote {rg ≻ rg ′ | {r, g} ∈ E(i, j)}, that is, one of the partial votes has the constraint rg ≻ rg ′ for each {r, g} ∈ E(i, j). The idea of this gadget is as follows. For every ordered color pair we have t edges and t − 1 corresponding votes. Within one vote, one pair of edge-candidates can get the two available zero positions. Thus, it is possible to set all but one, namely the selected pair of edge-candidates to zero positions.
The partial votes of V 2 realize the vertex selection gadgets. Here, we need k − 1 candidates corresponding to a selected vertex to do the vertex-edge match for all edges that are incident in a multicolored clique. To realize this,
we select a vertex and in V b 2 , by a cascading effect, we achieve that all k − 1 candidates that correspond to this vertex are selected. In V a 2 , for every color i, we have s − 1 copies of the partial vote {r 1 ≻ c r 1 | r ∈ X i }. In V b 2 , for every color i and for every vertex r ∈ X i , we have the following k − 2 votes.
For all odd z ∈ {1, . . . , k − 4}, v
The partial votes of V 3 realize the vertex-edge match gadgets. For i, j ∈ {1, . . . , k}, for j < i, V 3 contains the vote {rg ≻ r j | {r, g} ∈ E, r ∈ X i , and g ∈ X j } and, for j > i, V 3 contains the vote {rg ≻ r j−1 | {r, g} ∈ E, r ∈ X i , and g ∈ X j }.
The partial votes of V 4 realize the edge-edge match gadgets. For every unordered color pair {i, j}, i = j there is the partial vote {rg ′ ≻ gr ′ | r ∈ X i , g ∈ X j }. This completes the description of the partial profile. By counting, one can verify a property of the construction that is crucial to see the correctness: In total, the number of zero positions available in the partial votes is exactly equal to the sum of the minimum number of zero position the candidates of C\{c} must take such that c is a winner. We denote this property of the construction as tightness. It directly follows that if there is a candidate that takes more zero positions than desired, then c cannot win in this extension since then at least one zero position must be "missing" for another candidate.
V1 :
· · · > rg > rg ′ for i, j ∈ {1, . . . , k}, i = j, r ∈ Xi\Q, and g ∈ Xj \Q V a 2 :
· · · > r1 > c r 1
· · · > rg > rj for i, j ∈ {1, . . . , k}, j < i, r ∈ Xi ∩ Q, and g ∈ Xj ∩ Q · · · > rg > rj−1 for i, j ∈ {1, . . . , k}, j > i, r ∈ Xi ∩ Q, and g ∈ Xj ∩ Q V4 : Fig. 1 . Extension of the partial votes for the MC-instance. We highlight extensions in which candidates that do not correspond to the solution set Q take the zero positions.
Claim:
The graph G has a clique of size k if and only if c is a possible winner in P .
"⇒" Given a multicolored clique Q of G of size k. Then, extend the partial profile P as given in Figure 1 . One can verify that in the given extension every candidate takes the required number of zero positions.
"⇐" Given an extension of P in which c is a winner, we show that the "selected" candidates must correspond to a size-k clique. Recall that the number of zero positions that each candidate must take is "tight" in the sense that if one candidate gets an unnecessary zero position, then for another candidate there are not enough zero positions left. First (edge selection), for i, j ∈ {1, . . . , k}, i = j, we consider the candidates of C i,j . The candidates of C i,j can take zero positions in one vote of V 3 and in t − 1 votes of V 1 . Since |C i,j | = t and in the considered votes at most one candidate of C i,j can take a zero position, every candidate of C i,j must take one zero position in one of these votes. We refer to a candidate that takes the zero position in V 3 as solution candidate rg sol . For every non-solution candidate rg ∈ C i,j \{rg sol }, its placement in V 1 also implies that rg ′ gets a zero position, whereas rg ′ sol still needs to take one zero position (what is only possible in V 4 ).
Second, we consider the vertex selection gadgets. Here, analogously to the edge selection, for every color i, we can argue that in V a 2 , out of the set {r 1 | r ∈ X i }, we have to set all but one candidate to a zero position. The corresponding solution vertex is denoted as r sol . For every vertex r ∈ X i \{r sol }, this implies that the corresponding dummy-candidate c r 1 also takes a zero position in V a 2 . Now, we show that in V b 2 we have to set all candidates that correspond to non-solution vertices to a zero position whereas all candidates corresponding to r sol must appear only at one-positions. Since for every vertex r ∈ X i \{r sol }, the vertex c to the last two positions. Thus, one cannot set r sol2 and r sol3 to a zero position within V 2 . Hence, the only remaining possibility for r sol 2 and r sol 3 to get zero points remains within the corresponding votes in V 3 . This implies for every non-solution vertex r that r 2 and r 3 cannot get zero points in V 3 and, thus, we have to choose to put them on zero positions in the vote v Third, consider the vertex-edge match realized in V 3 . For i, j ∈ {1, . . . , k}, i = j, there is only one remaining vote in which rg sol with r ∈ X i and g ∈ X j can take a zero position. Hence, rg sol must take this zero-position. This does imply that the corresponding incident vertex x is also set to a zero-position in this vote. If x = r soli , then x has already a zero-position in V 2 . Hence, this would contradict the tightness and rg sol and the corresponding vertex must "match". Further, the construction ensures that each of the k − 1 candidates corresponding to one vertex appears exactly in one vote of V 3 (for each of the k − 1 candidates, the vote corresponds to edges from different colors). Hence, c can only be possible winner if a selected vertex matches with all selected incident edges.
Finally, we discuss the edge-edge match gadgets. In V 4 , for i, j ∈ {1, . . . , k}, i = j, one still need to set the solution candidates from C i,j to zero positions. We show that this can only be done if the two "opposite" selected edge-candidates match each other. For two such edges rg sol and gr sol , r ∈ X i , g ∈ X j , there is only one vote in V 4 in which they can get a zero position. If rg sol and gr sol refer to different edges, then in this vote only one of them can get zero points, and, thus, the other one still beats c. Altogether, if c is a possible winner, then the selected vertices and edges correspond to a multicolored clique of size k.
⊓ ⊔ By generalizing the reduction used for Lemma 1, one can show the following. The following theorem is based on further extensions of the MC-reduction used to prove Lemma 1 and some additional reductions from X3C. seems not to be possible in general. However, for every specific instance I or I ′ , it is not hard to compute a (polynomial) number of positions with equal/different scores that is sufficient for I or I ′ . For example, for the X3C-reduction used to show Theorem 1, for an instance (E, S), it would be clearly sufficient to have (|E| + |S|) 2 positions with equal score since this is a trivial upper bound for the number of candidates used to "encode" (E, S) into an POSSIBLE WINNER-instance. Having computed a sufficient number for all types of reductions either for I or I ′ (details omitted), we can set x to be the maximum of all these numbers.
Then, we can make use of the following observation (proof omitted). For r, there is a scoring vector whose size is polynomial in x such that either |{i | α i > α i+1 }| ≥ x or such that α i = · · · = α i+x for some i. Now, we can distinguish two cases. If α i = · · · = α i+x for some i, applying one of the reductions to I ′ or I given in Theorem 2 or Theorem 3 results in a POSSIBLE WINNER-instance that is a yes-instance (if and only if I ′ is a yes-instance and, thus, also) if and only if I is a yes-instance. Otherwise, we can apply the reductions given in the proof of Theorem 1 to I resulting in a POSSIBLE WINNER instance that is a yes-instance if and only if I is a yes-instance. Since the NPmembership is obvious, the main theorem follows.
⊓ ⊔
